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Abstract
We study the demand for Long Term Care (LTC hereafter) insurance in a setting where agents
have state-dependent preferences over both a daily life consumption good and LTC expendi-
tures. We assume that dependency creates a demand for LTC expenditures while decreasing
the marginal utility of daily life consumption, for any given consumption level. Agents optimize
over their consumption of both goods as well as over the amount of LTC insurance. We rst
show that some agents optimally choose not to insure themselves, while no agent wishes to buy
complete insurance, in accordance with the so-called LTC insurance puzzle. At equilibrium, the
transfer received from the insurer covers only a fraction of the LTC expenditures. The demand
for LTC insurance need not increase with income when preferences are non state-dependent or
insurance is actuarially unfair. Also, preferences have to be state-dependent with no insurance
bought to rationalize the empirical observation of a higher marginal utility at equilibrium when
autonomous. Finally, focusing on iso-elastic preferences, we recover the empirical observation
that health/LTC expenditures are not very sensitive to income, and we show that LTC insurance
as a fraction of income should decrease with income and then become nil above a threshold.
Keywords: Long Term Care Insurance Puzzle, Actuarially Fair Insurance, Risk Aversion,
State-dependent Preferences.
JEL Codes: D11, I13.
1 Introduction
Population is aging in most developed countries. According to OECD (2011), the fraction of
people aged 80 and above is expected to grow from 4% of the total OECD population in 2010 to
10% in 2050. This demographic trend creates new challenges for policy makers, as aging implies
taking care of an ever larger population with very specic health needs, called Long Term Care
(hereafter LTC) needs. LTC is dened as the day-to-day help with activities such as washing
and dressing, or help with household activities such as cleaning and cooking (OECD, 2011).
LTC often comes with additional type of support such as medical assistance. Individuals in need
of LTC are called dependent.
The costs of LTC are usually large and likely to exhaust most nancial resources of the
elderly dependent and of his family. For example, Genworth (2018) estimates that the monthly
median cost of home care services in the US in 2018 was around US$ 4,000 while that of a
semi-private room in a nursing home care was more than US$ 7,000. The risk of needing LTC is
also quite large. Brown and Finkelstein (2009) obtain that between 35% and 50% of 65-year-old
Americans will be in need of a nursing home at some point. Hurd et al. (2013) predict that
between 53% and 59% of 50 year old individuals will need LTC services later on in life.
Despite these trends, most people do not insure themselves against the risk of needing LTC.
For instance, only 2% of LTC expenditures are nanced by private LTC insurance (LTCI here-
after) in OECD countries, with a gure of 7% in the US (OECD, 2011). This lack of insurance
is referred to as the LTCI puzzle. A large body of the economics literature, both empirical and
theoretical, has tried to explain that puzzle (see Pestieau and Ponthiere (2011) for a survey).
Many explanations can be found either on the supply side (adverse selection, rationing e¤ects
which increase prices) or on the demand side (crowding out from social programs, substitution
with informal family care, risk misperceptions, bequest motives, lack of knowledge of the product
and of the LTC costs and institutional support, narrow framing).1
This paper provides an explanation for this lack of insurance by focusing on the change
in preferences as well as on the change in the composition of the consumption basket when
people become dependent. Dependency usually happens at a time in life (at older age, during
the retirement period) when individuals enjoy a type of consumption that depends very much
1Regarding supply-side explanations, see for example Brown and Finkelstein (2009), Sloan and Norton (1997),
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006). Regarding demand-side explanations, see Bonsang (2009), De Donder and
Leroux (2014, 2017), Boyer et al. (2019, 2020), Gottlieb and Mitchell (2019) among others.
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on their health status, such as leisure goods (traveling, attending cultural events, going to
restaurants, undertaking physical activities, etc.). When dependency strikes, those goods and
services become less easily accessible, or may provide less enjoyment.2 If the marginal utility of
those goods decreases with the advent of dependency, individuals may rationally refrain from
transferring resources to the dependency state by buying LTCI.
This explanation has received some attention in the empirical literature (as we detail below)
but, quite surprisingly, not in the theoretical literature dealing with the demand for LTCI.3 Our
paper proposes a simple theoretical model where we assume state-dependent preferences and
where we distinguish daily-life consumption from LTC expenditures (including the health ser-
vices component). This model enables us to determine the demand for (possibly non actuarially
fair) LTCI and how this demand is a¤ected by both the state-dependency of preferences and
the variation in the composition of the consumption bundle (between daily-life consumption and
health expenditures).
The state-dependency of preferences has long been discussed in the health economics litera-
ture, with the seminal contributions of Mossin (1968), Zeckhauser (1970) and Arrow (1974). In
that respect, our model is close to the literature on irreplaceable assets (see Zweifel and Eisen,
2012, pp. 81) which shows how the variation in the marginal utility of wealth between good
and bad health is likely to a¤ect the demand for insurance.4 Our model complements that
literature since, beyond introducing state-dependent preferences, we also allow for two di¤erent
types of goods which are, respectively, complement (daily-life consumption) and substitute (LTC
including health expenditures) to a good health.
Regarding the specic modeling of private LTCI decisions, to the best of our knowledge,
all theory papers (see, among others, Bascans et al., 2017; Courbage and Eeckhoudt, 2012;
Cremer and Pestieau, 2014; De Donder and Leroux, 2014; Canta et al., 2016; De Donder and
2This argument is especially relevant for LTC, as compared to generic health issues, because (i) for most health
ailments, treatments either bring the su¤erer back to a good health or at least allow her to function normally,
and (ii) dependency is mostly an absorbing state (followed by death) and is precisely dened by the di¢ culty to
perform certain activities, and hence to enjoy certain goods or services.
3The survey by Cremer et al. (2012) discusses the state-dependence of preferences among the explanations of
the LTCI puzzle. They do not develop a thorough model, but their discussion has a brief theoretical modeling
perspective.
4See also Cook and Graham (1977), Shioshansi (1982), Schlesinger (1984). Rey (2003) and Rey and Rochet
(2004) study how the relationship between health, marginal utility of wealth and the cross correlation of risks
(including uninsurable ones) inuence individual willingness to fully insure against a pecuniary risk. We use
interchangeably the terms of marginal utility of consumption, income or wealth to denote their impact on the
individuals utility in a specic state of nature (autonomy or dependency). See footnote 16 for the rationale of
this equivalence.
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Pestieau, 2017; Klimaviciute and Pestieau, 2018; Courbage and Montoliu-Montes, 2018) assume
that individuals consume a composite good (including LTC services in case of dependency) and
that preferences over this good are not a¤ected by the loss of autonomy. More precisely, this
literature models dependency as a xed monetary loss (i.e., a ransom), so that marginal utility
of consumption under dependency is higher than under autonomy, inducing all individuals to
fully insure when LTCI is available at actuarially fair terms.5
On the empirical side, the state-dependency of utilities is mentioned in surveys such as Brown
and Finkelstein (2009, 2011) and Davido¤ (2013). This empirical literature on state-dependent
preferences in the context of the loss of autonomy has failed so far to generate a consensus. On
the one hand, Lillard and Weiss (1997), and Ameriks et al. (2020), nd that marginal utility is
higher when dependent than when autonomous. On the other hand, Finkelstein et al. (2013),
Hong et al. (2015) and Koijen et al. (2016) obtain the opposite result.6 These papers di¤er in
their modeling of income, consumption, and in the scenarios considered. One crucial assumption
is whether agents consume the same composite good in sickness and in health (as in Lillard and
Weiss (1997) and Ameriks et al. (2020)) or whether agentsconsumption is unbundled between
LTC/health expenditures and other goods (as in Davido¤ (2013), Hong et al. (2015), Finkelstein
et al. (2013)). Finkelstein et al. (2013) note that it is a priori ambiguous whether the marginal
utility of consumption rises or falls with deteriorating health, given that some goods (e.g., travel)
are complements to good health whereas other goods (e.g., prepared meals or assistance with
self-care) are substitutes for good health. However, they obtain, using subjective well-being
measures from the Health and Retirement Survey, that a one standard deviation increase in an
individuals number of chronic diseases is associated with a 10%-25% decline in marginal utility
of consumption. Moreover, Blundell et al. (2020) nd that most of the e¤ect of temporary drops
5There are three recent exceptions, De Nardi et al. (2016), Achou (2020) and Leroux et al. (2021), that di¤er
from this paper in their objectives and contributions. Leroux et al. (2021) assume a composite good and lower
marginal utility of income under dependency together with extra LTC spending so as to ensure that individuals
partially insure themselves against dependency. Their objective is to study a normative problem in which an
ex-post egalitarian social planner wishes to compensate old-age dependent agents as well as short-lived agents for
their unluckiness. De Nardi et al. (2016) and Achou (2020) distinguish between pure health expenditures and
the consumption of non-medical goods, when modelling individualspreferences. Again their objectives are very
di¤erent from ours as Achou (2020) studies the welfare consequences of homestead exemption in the Medicaid
program while De Nardi et al. (2016) study the impact of Medicaid on redistribution.
6Lillard and Weiss (1997) study individualssaving and consumption decisions at the end of life using a sample
of individuals aged 65 and more, so that the bad health status could be interpreted as becoming dependent. Koijen
et al. (2016) estimate a health-state dependent utility function to analyze its e¤ect on the observed demand for
insurance products. Given their sample selection, their sick state may also be interpreted as being in need of
LTC. Finkelstein et al. (2013) consider the number of chronic diseases, which are closely linked to the advent of
dependency.
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in health on consumption stems from the reduction in the marginal utility of consumption that
they generate.
We proceed as in Finkelstein et al. (2013), Bajari et al. (2014), Hong et al. (2015), De
Nardi et al. (2016) and Achou (2020) by unbundling consumption and assuming that agents
derive specic utility from LTC (including health) services only when dependent. In that case,
the marginal utility of any given amount of non-LTC (or daily life) consumption is lower than
when autonomous, by assumption. All agents face the same probability of becoming dependent,
and di¤er in income. Before the advent of dependency, they choose how much LTCI to buy. We
allow for loading costs/actuarially unfair insurance.
We obtain that agents always buy less than full LTCI, with some agents preferring not to buy
any insurance at all, even when LTCI is actuarially fair. Our generalization of the irreplaceable
assets theory can then explain why there is little LTCI in practice. Moreover, we obtain that
the transfer received from the insurer at equilibrium covers only a fraction of the LTC expenses.
This can be related to LTCI contracts observed worldwide. In certain countries, such as Canada
for instance, rms sell a simple indemnity contract, with a transfer conditional only on the
advent of dependency, with no constraint on the use of the indemnity by the recipient. In other
countries, such as the US, the insured individual receives a (partial) reimbursement of incurred
LTCI expenses. In our model, the US-style constraints that all the insurance transfer be used
for LTC expenditures are not binding at equilibrium.
We study how the demand for insurance varies with income. We obtain that, while the
amount of LTCI should always increase with income when preferences are non state-dependent
and insurance is actuarially fair, this need not be the case when either assumption is not satised.
Note that lower marginal utility when dependent (than when autonomous) for any given daily
life consumption level need not imply lower marginal utility of income at equilibrium. The
reason is that, at the same time, dependency creates LTC needs, so that the amount of daily
life consumption is lower than income when dependent, unlike when autonomous, which in
turn increases marginal utility. We show that, at equilibrium, a higher marginal utility when
autonomous (as found in the empirical literature surveyed above) can only occur if preferences
are state-dependent and if agents do not buy LTCI at equilibrium (the empirical observation
that has given rise to the LTCI puzzle literature). Moreover, actuarial unfairness is neither
a necessary nor a su¢ cient condition for higher marginal utility of income at equilibrium when
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autonomous. This result then rationalizes empirical evidence, showing that state-dependency is
superior conditional on our model assumptions.
We then follow the empirical literature and assume iso-elastic preferences. This literature has
obtained that the relative risk aversion for LTC (including health) expenditures is higher than
for (non LTC) consumption. We then obtain, in accordance with this empirical literature, that
the elasticity of LTC/health expenditures to income is low. We also establish in this case that
the share of income that an individual devotes to LTCI at equilibrium decreases with income,
and becomes nil above a threshold income level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, including the individual
choices, how they vary with respect to income, and the comparison of marginal utility of income
when dependent and when autonomous. Section 3 introduces iso-elastic utility functions. Section
4 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 State-dependent utilities
Individual derive utility both from the consumption c of a daily-life, non-LTC, good and from
their health status h. In old age, an agent can be either autonomous, denoted by a or dependent,
denoted by d. Her health status depends on both whether she is dependent or autonomous, and
on the amount of LTC (including health) expenditures z she consumes. The utility of an agent
in state i = fa; dg is denoted by
Ui(c; z) = ui(c)  hi(z);
so that we make the simplifying assumption that utility is separable in consumption and in
health status, in both states of the world.7
7This separability assumption is made by most empirical papers: see Finkelstein et al. (2013), De Nardi et
al. (2016), Achou (2020) and Bajari et al. (2014). These papers further assume iso-elastic utility functions, as
we do in Section 3. Note that most of our results (Propositions 1 and 4 as well as most of Proposition 2) carry
through to the case of complementarity between the health status and daily-life consumption (proof available
upon request). The variation of ca with w in Proposition 2 as well as Proposition 3 would require additional
assumptions on the third-order derivatives of the utility function in case of dependence.
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The utility of daily-life(or non-LTC) consumption is state-dependent with
u0i(:) > 0; u
00









The rst line is standard, with increasing and concave utility from consumption, independently
of the dependency status, while the second line is the usual Inada condition. The third line
states that when autonomous, both the marginal and the absolute utility of consuming any
given amount x are higher than when dependent. This reects the observation that daily life
consumption (such as restaurants, travel, clothing, active leisure, etc.) is more enjoyable when
in good health than when dependent. In that sense, daily-life consumption and a good health
are assumed to be complements.
We assume for simplicity that autonomous agents need no LTC expenditures (ha(z) = 0;8z)
and always choose z = 0.8 As for dependent agents, we assume that hd(z) = h(z)  0, h0(z)  0,
h00(z)  0 and h0(0)!  1. In words, LTC expenditures generate innite utility at the margin
when z = 0, with decreasing marginal utility as z increases (recall that we subtract h(z) > 0
to obtain the individuals utility). LTC expenditures and a good health (i.e. autonomy) are
substitutes.
Therefore, the agents utility when autonomous is
Ua(c; z) = ua(c)
while it is
Ud(c; z) = ud(c)  h(z)
when dependent.
As mentioned in the introduction, most theoretical papers about LTCI (Canta et al., 2016;
Cremer and Pestieau, 2014; De Donder and Leroux, 2014; De Donder and Pestieau, 2017;
Klimaviciute and Pestieau, 2018) di¤er from ours in at least two respects. First, they do not
model state-dependent preferences and the advent of dependency is introduced as a ransom
deducted from income. Second, they do not make the distinction between the utility obtained
8The crucial assumption we need is that marginal utility of LTC expenditures is higher under dependency
than under autonomy: -h0d(z) >  h0a(z). Assuming that h0a(z) = 0 is then without further loss of generality.
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from consuming daily-life goods and from consuming LTC goods. In our framework, this would
translate into h(x) = 0;8x, and ua(c) = ud(c) = u(c) where c is a unique composite good, with
a xed monetary loss z when dependent. This would imply that the utility under autonomy
is higher than under dependency (u(c) > u(c   z)) with the opposite relationship for marginal
utility (u0(c z) > u0(c)). Distinguishing between daily-life consumption and health expenditures
also allows us to model endogenous LTC health expenditures.
2.2 Individual choices
At the time of taking the decision to get insured against the LTC risk, all agents face the same
probability p 2 [0; 1] of becoming dependent. Private insurance contracts are described by the
premium t  0 paid in return for a LTC benet t=p in case of dependency. The degree of
actuarial fairness of the LTC is accounted for through the parameter 0    1. If the insurance
market is perfectly competitive (prots of insurance rms are driven to zero) with no loading
costs, agents face an actuarially fair insurance market and  = 1.9 With loading costs, we have
 < 1 and the insurance o¤ers actuarially unfair returns.10 Note that the empirical literature
has established that existing LTCI contracts are actuarially unfair, although their degree of
unfairness is not especially large compared with other types of contracts and by itself does
not explain the low demand for LTCI.11 Our modelling allows us to disentangle the impact of
actuarial (un)fairness and of state-dependent preferences in explaining this low demand.
We denote an individual by the income w she is endowed with. Agents choose simultaneously
the amount of insurance premium t  0 and the amount of LTC expenditures z  0 in case of
dependency to maximize their expected utility function:12
EU(t; z) = (1  p)ua(ca) + p[ud(cd)  h(z)];
where ca = w   t is consumption if autonomous while cd = w   t +  tp   z is consumption if
dependent.
9This modeling also corresponds to the case of a non redistributive public LTC insurance.
10Our approach is equivalent to assuming that agents pay a premium of t= to receive an indemnity of t=p. In
that formulation, the loading cost (i.e., percentage of the premium paid above the actuarially fair one) is 1=.
11Brown and Finkelstein (2007) estimate that  = 0:82 while Achou (2021) nds that  = 0:94 for women.
12Assuming a two-period model in which the individual is in good health with certainty and pays a premium in
the rst period, but may become dependent and obtain a LTC benet in the second, would allow us to introduce
saving, which would in turn reduce the willingness to pay for insurance. Appendix B shows that we would obtain
similar results, so we stick with the simpler model throughout the paper. Also, whether z is chosen at the same
time as t, or later on when dependency arises, is of no consequence here since we assume away time inconsistency
or any other behavioral problem.
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First-order conditions with respect to LTC expenditures, z and the premium paid, t are:13
@EU
@z
=  u0d(cd)  h0(z) = 0; (1)
@EU
@t
= (  p)u0d(cd)  (1  p)u0a(ca)  0: (2)
We denote by (z; t) the solution to this system of two equations, with the corresponding
consumption levels ca and c

d. The assumption that h
0(0) !  1 implies that equation (1)
always holds with equality, so that z > 0. It will prove useful to denote by z0 the optimal
level of LTC expenditures (satisfying equation (1)) when t = 0. In that case, we denote the
consumption bundle as (z0, c0d, c
0
a) with z
0 > 0, c0a = w > c
0
d = w   z0.
Our rst proposition below provides a simple explanation as to why agents may not insure
themselves against dependency even though they are risk averse and may incur extra expenses
when dependent. This proposition generalizes the result of under-insurance obtained in the
irreplaceable assets literature mentioned in the introduction to the case where (i) agents consume
di¤erent goods when the damage occurs and (ii) they optimize over the quantities of the two
goods purchased.
Proposition 1 (i) An agent chooses to (resp., not to) buy LTCI if (   p)u0d(w   z0) > (1  
p)u0a(w) (resp.,).
(ii) If the agent decides to insure herself, the level of LTCI coverage is incomplete, that is cd < c

a
and t < pz=.
(iii) (a) z0  z  z0 + t(  p)=p with strict inequalities i¤ t > 0. (b) c0a  ca > cd  c0d with
strict inequalities i¤ t > 0.
Proof. (i) The agent decides to buy insurance if and only if her marginal gain from buying
insurance is positive when t = 0, namely
(  p)u0d(w   z0)  (1  p)u0a(w) > 0: (3)
(ii) We now assume that (   p)u0d(w   z0) > (1   p)u0a(w) so that the agent buys LTCI at
equilibrium. In that case, the FOC with respect to t holds with equality and t is dened by
(  p)u0d(w   t   z + 
t
p
) = (1  p)u0a(w   t) (4)
13We assume that second-order conditions are satised.
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where z is dened by u0d(w t z+t=p) = h0(z). Equation (4) together with u0d(x) < u0a(x)
and with the concavity of both ud and ua imply that cd < c

a and thus that t
 < pz=.
(iii) See Appendix A.
First note that a necessary (although not su¢ cient) condition for t to be positive is that the
degree of actuarial fairness be greater than the probability to become dependenti.e.  > p 
since this is a necessary condition for the payment received when dependent to be larger than
the premium paid.
The advent of dependency has two impacts of opposite signs on the demand for insurance. On
the one hand, dependent agents bear additional expenses z; inducing them to insure themselves
so as to smooth consumption. On the other hand, dependency reduces the marginal utility of
daily life consumption, decreasing the incentive to insure and transfer resources to the bad state
of the world. Depending on which e¤ect dominates, the agent chooses to insure herself or not.
Part (i) above shows that a necessary condition for the agentsdemand for LTCI to be positive
is that their marginal utility of consumption be larger when dependent than when autonomous,
when the former is measured at the consumption level obtained in the absence of insurance (i.e.,
when t = 0 so that z = z0).14 This condition is also su¢ cient if the insurance is actuarially fair
( = 1):
The second result in Proposition 1 that t < pz= implies that agents optimally buy more
LTC expenditures than the insurance transfer received, whatever the degree of fairness of the
LTCI contracts, . This has an interesting implication when looking at the LTCI contracts used
in practice. We model a simple indemnity contract, with a transfer conditional only on the
advent of dependency. In such contracts (observed in Canada, for instance), the transfer can
be used by the recipient at her discretion, and need not fund exclusively LTC expenditures. In
other countries, such as the US, the insured receives a (partial) reimbursement of incurred LTC
expenditures, so that the transfer received is lower than these expenses. In our model, it is a
property of the equilibrium allocation that the transfer is lower than the LTC expenses incurred
(as measured by z). In other words, the US-style constraints that all the transfer be used for
LTC expenditures are not binding at equilibrium.
The third result of Proposition 1 compares the allocation with and without insurance and
14Actually, if (   p)u0d(w   z0) < (1   p)u0a(w), agents would want to transfer resources from dependency
towards autonomy (i.e., they would prefer t < 0). We are unaware of the existence of such nancial instruments,
which is why we restrict t to be non-negative.
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shows that part of the insurance transfer, net of the premium paid (i.e., t=p   t), is used
to nance increased LTC expenditures while the remainder is used to increase the non-LTC
consumption level, so as to partially compensate for the loss in daily-life consumption utility
due to dependency.
We now look at how the optimal insurance behavior varies with individual income, w.
2.3 Comparative statics with respect to income
In this section, we explore how the agents insurance behavior varies with her income, w. Our
results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 We obtain that:
1. LTC expenditures z are increasing with w:
2. The amount, t, of LTCI bought is increasing in w if RAa (c

a)  RAd (cd) (where RAi (ci) =
 u00i (ci)=u0i(ci) for i = fa; dg) .
3. Consumption levels cd, c










Proposition 2 shows that LTC expenditures are a normal good (part 1), as well as non-LTC
expenditures, whether the insurance amount is chosen optimally to be positive (part 3) or is nil
(part 4).
Part 2 of Proposition 2 is obtained by di¤erentiating the optimality condition for an interior



















where we made use of (2) to obtain the last line. Using the implicit function theorem, this
expression has the same sign as dt=dw.15
15Alternatively, using Cramers rule would allow us to obtain the same results.
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Recall that t is chosen in order to equalize marginal utilities of non-LTC consumptions c in
both states of the world, given the choice of LTC expenditures z. Increasing w then has both
a direct and an indirect impact on the marginal expected utility of t. The direct impact (rst
term in (5)) is that a higher income a¤ects the balance of marginal utilities across both states
of the world, for a given z, while the indirect impact (second term in (5)) operates through the
variation of z generated by an increase in w. As we know that z increases with w, this indirect
impact is always positive, as the individual wishes to transfer more resources to the dependency
state. The sign of the direct impact is a priori ambiguous, and depends on the comparison of
the coe¢ cients of absolute risk aversion, as shown in (6).
When insurance is actuarially fair and preferences are not state-dependent, the agent equal-
izes consumption in both states so that the direct e¤ect disappears, and higher income agents
always prefer a larger value of t, thanks to the indirect impact stated above. The direct ef-
fect is generically non nil when insurance is not actuarially fair or when preferences are state-
dependent. If the rst term in (5) is positive, marginal utility decreases more slowly with income
when dependent than when autonomous, which induces the agent to transfer more income to
the dependency statei.e., to increase t. In that case, both (direct and indirect) e¤ects concur
to increase t.
The rst term in (6) shows that the comparison of the degree of concavity of the state-
dependent utility functions can be expressed in terms of risk aversion, with a higher risk aversion
coe¢ cient when autonomous (compared to the dependency state) translating into a more concave
utility, and thus a larger decrease in marginal utility when income increases. Note that this
remains true whether insurance is actuarially fair or not. Finally, when the rst term in (5) or
(6) is negative, the sign of the total derivative of t with respect to w is ambiguous, so that t
may be non monotone in income.
The following proposition shows that focusing instead on the insurance rate, denoted  =
t=w; allows us to sign the impact of income in a non-ambiguous way.
Proposition 3 When strictly positive, the insurance rate  is increasing (resp. decreasing) in
w when RRz (z
)"z;w < RRa (c

a) (resp. >), with R
R
z (z) =  h00(z)z=h0(z), RRa (c) =  u00a(c)c=u0a(c)
and "z;w is the elasticity of LTC expenditures to income, measured at the preferred choice of
the individual.
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The role of risk aversion in Proposition 3 runs as follows. A large risk aversion for daily-
life consumption when autonomous means that the function ua(c) is very concave, so that an
increase in income induces the agent to transfer a larger fraction of her income to the dependency
state. Analogously, a large risk aversion for LTC expenditures means that the function h(z) is
very convex, so that the agent does not wish to increase her LTC expenditures by much and
actually decreases the share of her income devoted to LTCI.
As for the role of the elasticity of LTC expenditures to income, note that, for given values of
RRz (z) and R
R
a (ca), a low value of "z;w means that the individual has to transfer proportionally
more income to the dependency state if she wants to increase her LTC expendituresi.e., she
increases .
Finally, note that  increasing with w implies that t increases with w, while  decreasing
with w is compatible with t either increasing or decreasing with w.
2.4 Comparison of equilibrium marginal utilities across states
In this section, we compare equilibrium marginal utilities across the two states of the world (au-
tonomy and dependency). It will prove handy to introduce a specic notation for the equilibrium
utility in each state as, respectively,
Va = ua(c

a) = ua(wa): (7)
Vd = ud(c

d)  h(z) = ud(wd   z)  h(z); (8)
where the income in each state of nature, after buying the insurance, is dened by
wa = w   t;


















d)dcd   h0(z)dz = u0d(cd)[dcd + dz] = u0d(cd)dwd















16 This explains the equivalence between marginal utility of income and of consumption mentioned in the
introduction to the paper.
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with a strict inequality only if t = 0.
It is worth looking more closely at equation (9), to conclude that
Proposition 4 The only case where dVa=dwa > dVd=dwd at equilibrium is when preferences are
state-dependent with t = 0.
Proof.
1.  = 1 and t > 0 imply that dVa=dwa = dVd=dwd.
2.  < 1 and t > 0 imply that (a) (1  p)=(  p) > 1 and, (b) that (9) holds with equality,
implying that dVa=dwa < dVd=dwd:
3.  = 1 and t = 0 imply that u0a(w)  u0d(w   z0) (by the FOC (2)) so that dVa=dwa 
dVd=dwd. Note that this case cannot arise with NSD preferences, since it would mean
u0(w)  u0(w   z0), which is impossible given that z0 > 0 and that u00(x) < 0.
4.  < 1 and t = 0 imply that 1 p pu
0
a(w)  u0d(w z0) with (1 p)=( p) > 1: Note that (a)
in the case of non-state dependent preferences, we always have u0(w) < u0(w  z0) so that
dVa=dwa < dVd=dwd; while (b) with SD preferences, we may have that u0a(w) > u
0
d(w z0)
so that we may obtain that dVa=dwa > dVd=dwd.
First, if agents insure themselves (t > 0) when insurance is actuarially fair ( = 1), we
obtain the well known result of equalization of marginal utilities, whether preferences are state
dependent (SD) or not (NSD). Actually, the only di¤erence between the two formulations is that
an actuarially fair insurance is a su¢ cient condition to have t > 0 only with NSD preferences.
With actuarially unfair but positive insurance ( < 1, t > 0), we obtain that marginal utility is
higher when dependent than when autonomous both with SD and NSD preferences. We obtain
the opposite ranking of marginal utilities when t = 0 and  = 1 (a case which cannot occur
with NSD preferences). Finally, when  < 1 and t = 0, marginal utility is always (weakly)
higher when dependent with NSD, but may be lower with SD preferences.17
The intuition for these results goes as follows. Looking at expression (9), dependency has two
impacts on the marginal utility of income. First, with state-dependent preferences, dependency
17 It is actually easy to nd examples where u0a(ca) > u
0(cd) when t = 0 within the class of iso-elastic utility
functions studied in Section 3, by setting  low and  close to 1, so that the state dependent dimension overrides
the loading costs dimension in the comparison of marginal utilities.
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decreases marginal utility for any given consumption level, by assumption. Second, dependency
creates needs for LTC expenditures, decreasing the amount of non-LTC consumption bought
at equilibrium from any given income level. This in turn increases marginal utility of non-LTC
consumption, due to the concavity of the utility function. If the second e¤ect dominates the
rst one, then agents do buy insurance at equilibrium (t > 0). They equalize marginal utilities
if insurance is fair ( = 1), but fall short of that if LTCI is unfair ( < 1), so that the marginal
utility of income is larger when dependent than when autonomous at equilibrium. If the rst
e¤ect dominates the second, marginal utility of income is larger when autonomous than when
dependent even in the absence of insurance, and agents have no incentive to buy LTCI.
Proposition 4 is consistent with empirical evidence, showing that conditional on the model
assumptions, the assumption of state-dependency is superior. Empirical papers such as Finkel-
stein et al. (2013) obtain that marginal utility is lower when dependent than when autonomous
at equilibrium. Proposition 4 then implies both that people do not buy LTCI (the very subject
of the LTCI puzzle) and that preferences are state-dependent. Note especially that actuarially
unfair insurance ( < 1) is neither necessary nor su¢ cient to obtain this result.
3 Iso-elastic utility functions
The introduction of the widely used iso-elastic functional forms for the utility of daily-life con-
sumption and health expenditures (as in Finkelstein et al., 2013; Bajari et al., 2014; Hong et
al., 2015; De Nardi et al., 2016; Ameriks et al., 2020; Achou, 2020) allows us to shed more light
on the LTC insurance and consumption behavior of agents.
3.1 State-dependent preferences for non-LTC consumption
We assume the following form for state-dependent preferences for non-LTC consumption.
Assumption 1
ud(x) = ua(x)




and  < 1.
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This formulation implies that the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion () is smaller than one,
which is consistent with empirical evidence. For instance, Karagyozova and Siegelman (2012)
review the empirical literature regarding the estimation of the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient
and nd that assuming that it is smaller than 1 is reasonable.18 We now show that how the
elasticity of LTC expenditures to income compares with unity determines both whether low or
high income individuals choose not to buy LTCI, and whether LTC expenditures as a share of
income increase or decrease with income when agents do not buy LTCI (either because their
most-preferred level is nil, or because such insurance is not available).
Proposition 5 When Assumption 1 holds, "z0;w = (dz0=dw)(w=z0) < 1 (resp., >1) implies
that (i) agents with an income lower than a threshold ~w (resp., higher) dened in the Appendix
insure themselves at equilibrium, and that (ii) z0=w decreases (resp., increases) with w.
The intuition for this result runs as follows. Recall that agents buy insurance if their marginal
utility of (non-LTC) consumption when dependent is larger than when autonomous, in the case
where LTC expenditures are nanced from their own resources (i.e., we have ( p)u0d(w z0) >
(1  p)u0a(w)). Recall also that the advent of dependency has two impacts of opposite signs on
the demand for LTCI. First, it reduces the marginal utility of non-LTC consumption (depressing
the demand for LTCI). Second, it increases the need for LTC expenditures, and thus decreases
the income available for the non-LTC consumption good (increasing the demand for LTCI). If
the elasticity of LTC expenditures to income, "z0;w; is smaller than one, then high-income agents
do not increase much their demand for LTC expenditures, z0, muting the second e¤ect above
and resulting in high-income agents preferring not to buy LTCI. This explains part (i) of the
above proposition. At the same time, the share of LTC expenditures in income w decreases
(part (ii) of the above proposition). The opposite occurs when "z0;w > 1:
Observe that Proposition 5 does not depend on any functional form assumption for the utility
obtained from LTC expenditures when dependent.
3.2 Preferences for LTC expenditures
We now introduce a functional form for the benet obtained from LTC expenditures when
dependent.
18Similarly, Holt and Laury (2002) nd that 64% of respondents have a coe¢ cient between 0.15 and 0.97.
Chetty (2006) nds a mean value for that coe¢ cient equal to 0.71.
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Assumption 2
h(z) = A  z
1 
1  ;
where A is a large positive constant and  < 1.
Note that the constant A is introduced only to make sure that agents are better-o¤ au-
tonomous than dependent, for any value of ca = cd and any value of z  0, but will play no role
in the rest of the analysis.
The following lemma (proved in the Appendix) will be useful when looking for the conditions
underlying the variation of the insurance rate  with respect to w.
Lemma 1 When Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the elasticity of LTC expenditures with respect to
income is such that, for z 2 fz0; zg, (i) if  = , "z;w = 1, (ii) if  > , "z;w > 1, (iii) if
 < , "z;w < 1.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we obtain that the coe¢ cients of relative risk aversion are
RRr (z) = ; and R
R
a (c) = R
R
d (c) =  . If  > , agents are more averse to variations in LTC
expenditures z than in consumption c. The choice of z is then less sensitive to variations in
income w than the choice of consumption c, resulting in an elasticity of LTC expenditures to
income lower than the elasticity of daily-consumption to income.19
Note that the empirical evidence strongly suggests that  >  (see Bajari et al., 2014; De
Nardi et al., 2016 and Achou, 2020) i.e., that the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient regarding
health/LTC expenditures is higher than the one regarding non-LTC consumption. Moreover,
De Nardi et al. (2021, gure 5) nd little variations of z with permanent income which is
consistent with Lemma 1, under the assumption that  > . This is also conrmed by Blundell
et al. (2020) who obtain that income shocks a¤ect non durable consumption but not medical
expenses.




















d) =  and R
R
z (z
) =  under Assumptions 1 and 2, we have that "c
d
;w > "z;w if  > :
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We now look at how the absolute amount of LTCI bought at equilibrium (i.e., t) varies with









=cd so that the direct e¤ect of w on the variation of t
 observed in (6) is always negative,
while the indirect e¤ect is positive. The overall impact of w on t is then ambiguous, but we
nevertheless obtain that the variation of t with respect to w is smaller than if preferences were
not state-dependent (in which case there is no direct e¤ect).
We then look at how the the income share of LTCI, , varies with income in the next
proposition:
Proposition 6 When Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, with  > ,  decreases with w up to the
threshold ~w above which  = 0.
We rst study the reasons why agents decide to insure or not, depending on the comparison
between  and . Lemma 1 has shown that "z0;w < 1 if  > , while Proposition 5 has shown
that, in this case, only poor people (i.e., with income smaller than ~w) insure themselves.
We now move to the comparative statics of  with respect to w when  > 0. Note rst that
Proposition 3 together with Lemma 1 are inconclusive, since Lemma 1 implies that "z;w < 1
when  = RRz (z) >  = R
R
a (c): The intuition for Proposition 6 then runs as follows. Because
of the larger curvature of the utility for LTC expenditures in comparison to the curvature of
daily-life consumption utility, a higher income w translates into a small increase in z. This
small increase in z can then be nanced by a smaller share of LTCI premium in income, so that
 decreases with w. Observe that this complements Proposition 5 which has shown that low
income agents insure themselves at equilibrium when "z0;w < 1 (which, by Lemma 1, corresponds
to  > ).
Proposition 6 then constitutes a testable implication of our model. To the best of our
knowledge, empirical papers looking at the relationship between LTCI and income or wealth
report aggregate results, such as the proportion of individuals holding LTCI in various wealth
quantiles.20 Testing Proposition 6 would require to collect information on the premium paid by
individuals for LTC insurance. This information is available in the Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS) but, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been used for that purpose. One challenge
20See for instance Lockwood (2018) and Mommaerts (2020) who report that the proportion of individuals
holding LTCI increases with wealth.
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would consist in controlling adequately for pre-existing public insurance (i.e. Medicaid), which is
likely to insure more the poor people than the rich ones. This may require combining both HRS
and Medicare Current Beneciary Survey (MCBS) data as only the latter contains information
on Medicaid payments.
4 Conclusions
We have followed a positive approach where individuals choose how much LTCI to buy, in
a setting where autonomous agents only care about daily-life, non-LTC, consumption while
dependent agents also care about LTC expenditures. We assume from the outset that the
marginal utility of non-LTC consumption is lower when dependent than when autonomous, for
any given consumption level, as suggested by the empirical literature, and in stark contrast with
most of the theoretical literature on LTC. We then study the consequences of this assumption
for the demand for LTCI and for consumption behavior.
We rst obtain that some individuals optimally choose not to buy any LTCI, while no one
buys full insurance even with actuarially fair insurance. Also, the transfer received from the
insurer at equilibrium covers only a fraction of the LTC expenses. While non state-dependent
preferences together with actuarial fairness imply that the amount of LTCI increases with in-
come, this need not be the case when either assumption is not satised. Preferences have
to be state-dependent with no insurance bought to rationalize the empirical observation of a
higher marginal utility when autonomous than when dependent, at equilibrium, whether LTCI
is actuarially fair or not. Finally, focusing on iso-elastic preferences, we recover the empirical
observation that health/LTC expenditures are not very sensitive to income when risk aversion
is higher for health/LTC expenditures than for non-LTC expenditures, and we show that this
ensures that LTCI as a fraction of income should decrease with income and then become nil
above a threshold.
The model we propose, while very simple, delivers results which are in line with the empir-
ical literature, and which cannot be generated only with non state-dependent preferences and
actuarially unfair LTCI. The LTCI puzzle vanishes when state-dependency is introduced, since
low insurance take-up becomes a rational behavior. Yet, our model also raises new empirical
questions, in particular as to how the amount of LTCI and its share in income vary with individ-
ual income. Extending the analysis of Blundell et al. (2020) to permanent health shocks, such
18
an empirical estimation could try and disentangle the di¤erent e¤ects at play (state-dependency
of preferences vs straightforward income e¤ects). These empirical questions are certainly worth
exploring both for governments and for private insurers.
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Appendix A: proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
(iii) (a) If t = 0, we have by denition that z0 = z = z0+t( p)=p: Assume then that t > 0.
Assume by contradiction that z0 > z, so that  h0(z0) <  h0(z). Comparing the equation (1)
with z and z0, this implies that
u0d(w   z0) < u0d(w   z + t(  p)=p)
, w   z0 > w   z + t(  p)=p
, z > z0 + t(  p)=p
which contradicts that z0 > z. Proceeding similarly then shows that z0 < z implies that
z < z0 + t(  p)=p when  > p.
(b) If t = 0, we have by denition that c0a = c

a = w > c

d = w  z = c0d = w  z0: Assume then
that t > 0 so that  > p. We have that c0a = w > c

a = w   t > cd = w + t(   p)=p   z =
w   t + (t=p  z) since Proposition 1 (ii) has shown that z > t=p: Finally, cd > c0d since
z < z0 + t(  p)=p:
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Proof of Proposition 2
1. In order to nd the variation of health expenditures with income, we apply Cramers rule on
equations (1) and (2). We obtain that 0 < dz=dw < 1=p.
2. See text below Proposition 2.
3. Since z increases with w, the FOC for z (equation (1)) implies that cd increases with w
as well. Using the FOC for t (equation (2)), we obtain that ca = w   t increases with w, so
that dt=dw < 1:
4. Fully di¤erentiating the FOC for z (equation (1)) when t = 0, with respect to w, we











This in turn implies that dc0d=dw 2 [0; 1]:
Proof of Proposition 3
Changing notations for  = t=w and replacing (1) into (2), we obtain:
  (  p)h0(z)  u0a(w(1  )) = 0 (10)
































where RRa (c) =  u00a(c)c=u0a(c) and RRz (z) =  h00(z)z=h0(z).
Proof of Proposition 5









Denote by ~w the value of w equalizing both sides of (11), namely
(  p)( ~w   z0)    (1  p) ~w  = 0:
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Observe that the right hand side of (11) is increasing (resp., decreasing) in w if and only if the
elasticity of health expenditure to income, "z0;w = (dz
0=dw)(w=z0); is smaller (resp., larger)
than one, so that the value of ~w is unique when it exists. When "z0;w < 1, agents with w < ~w
insure themselves, while agents with w > ~w insure themselves if "z0;w > 1: Note that we set
~w = +1 if (i) (11) is satised for all agents (i.e., including the highest income) when "z0;w < 1
(so that everyone insures at equilibrium) or if (11) is not satised, even for the highest income
when "z0;w > 1 (so that no one insures at equilibrium). Alternatively, we set ~w = 0 if (i) (11) is
satised for no agent (i.e., including the lowest income) when "z0;w < 1 (so that no one insures
at equilibrium) or if (11) is satised for all agents (including the lowest income) when "z0;w > 1
(so that everyone insures at equilibrium).













< 0, z00w < z0
, "z0;w < 1:
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume rst that t > 0. Let us make a change of variables in (1) and (2) with  = t=w and
z = z=w:
  (1   + 
p
   z)  + z w  = 0; (12)
(  p)(1   + 
p
   z)    (1  p)(1  )  = 0; (13)
when t is interior. Applying Cramers rule on the above two equations, dz=dw < 0 if  > .










it is straightforward to show that dz=dw > 0; < 0;= 0 when  >;<;=  implies that "z;w >;<
;= 1.
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Assume now that t = 0, the FOC on z can be rewritten as follows
 [w   z0]  + (z0)  = 0
























z0 +  cd
:
which yields Lemma 1 for "z0;w.
Proof of Proposition 6
The threshold productivity ~w is dened in the proof of Proposition 5. Applying Cramers rule
on (12) and (13), one nds that d=dw < 0 if  < .
Appendix B: Two-period model
Let us assume a two-period model where in the rst period, the agent decides to save for his old
days and to invest in a LTCI in case he becomes dependent in the second period. In the second
period, if he is autonomous, he consumes his savings, while if he becomes dependent he receives
in addition a LTC benet. Under that alternative modeling, the agents expected utility writes
as follows:
EU(t; z) = ua(x) + (1  p)ua(ca) + p[ud(cd)  h(z)];
where x = w   s   t is rst-period consumption under autonomy (with certainty the agent is
autonomous), ca = Rs is second-period consumption if the agent is autonomous while cd =
Rs+  tp   z is second-period consumption if dependent.




=  u0a(x) +R[pu0d(cd) + (1  p)u0a(ca)] = 0 (14)
@EU
@z
=  u0d(cd)  h0(z) = 0; (15)
@EU
@t
=  u0a(x) + u0d(cd)  0: (16)
21We assume that second-order conditions are satised.
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For simplicity, assume that R = 1. Under Inada conditions (h0(0)!  1 and u0a(0)!1), it is
necessarily the case that s; z > 0.
Replacing for eq. (14), the FOC with respect to t, eq. (16), can be rewritten as follows:
@EU
@t
= (  p)u0d(cd)  (1  p)u0a(s)  0:
A necessary condition for t to be positive is that the degree of actuarial fairness is greater than
the probability to become dependent, i.e.  > p. In the following, we make this assumption.
We denote by (s; z; t) the solution to this system of 3 equations, with the corresponding




It will prove useful to denote by s0 and z0 the optimal levels of savings and LTC expenditures
(satisfying equations 14 and 15) when t = 0. In that case, we denote the consumption bundle
as (z0, x0, c0d, c
0
a).
Our proposition below provides results similar to those we obtained in the baseline model
where we had assumed away savings.
Proposition 7 (i) An agent chooses to (resp., not to) buy LTCI if u0d(s
0 z0) > u0a(w s0)
(resp.,),
or equivalently, if (  p)u0d(s0   z0) > (1  p)u0a(s0)(resp.,).





(iii) z0  z and s0  s+ t=p with strict inequalities i¤ t > 0. We also have that c0a  c0d 
cd  c0d with strict inequalities i¤ t > 0.
Proof. (i) The agent decides to buy insurance if and only if her marginal gain from buying
insurance is positive when t = 0, namely
u0d(s
0   z0) > u0a(w   s0): (17)
(ii) We now assume that u0d(s
0 z0) > u0a(w s0) so that the agent buys LTCI at equilibrium.
In that case, the FOC with respect to t holds with equality and t is dened by
u0a(w   s   t) = u0d(cd) (18)
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where s is dened by eq. (14), z is dened (15). Since   1 and u0a(:) > u0d(:), we obtain
from equation (18), that




We further use equation (14), and since u0a(x
)  u0d(cd), we can deduce that u0d(cd)  u0a(x) 
u0a(c

a), and thus that c

d < x
  ca (where the equality holds if and only if  = 1). This in turn
implies that s > s + tp   z
 and thus that z > t

p .
(iii) If t = 0, we have by denition that z0 = z and s0 = s + t=p: Assume then that
t > 0.
Assume by contradiction that z0 > z. We then have that  h0(z0) <  h0(z). Comparing
the equation (15) with z and z0, we obtain that
) u0d(s0   z0) < u0d(s   z + t=p) (19)
, s0   z0 > s   z + t=p
) s0 > s + t=p: (20)
under z0 > z.
Making use of the FOCs on s, evaluated for t = 0 and for t:
@EU
@s
jt=0 =  u0a(w   s0) + pu0d(s0   z0) + (1  p)u0a(s0) = 0; (21)
@EU
@s
jt=t =  u0a(w   s   t) + pu0d(s   z + t=p) + (1  p)u0a(s) = 0; (22)
together with (19), we obtain
u0a(w   s0)  (1  p)u0a(s0) < u0a(w   s   t)  (1  p)u0a(s):
Note that (20) implies that s0 > s; which in turn leads to
u0a(w   s0) < u0a(w   s   t);
or equivalently that s0 < s + t, a contradiction, with (20) since  > p (a necessary condition
to have t > 0).
Proceeding as above (see eq. (19)) while assuming that z0 < z, we obtain that c0d = s
0 z0 <
cd = s
   z + t=p and that s0 < s + t=p:
We now prove that s0 > s(so that c0a > c

a). Assume rather that s








Recall that we have just proved that c0d < c









d). Using these two inequalities
together with the FOCs on s, eqs. (21) and (22), we obtain that u0a(x
0) > u0a(x
), implying that
s0 > s + t, a contradiction with the assumption that s0 < s.
Given that s0 > s, we are unable to compare x0and x (so that we may have s0 7 s + t).
Putting all this together, we have proved that
c0a  ca  cd  c0d
with strict inequalities i¤ t > 0.
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